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Abstract
This paper explores the efficiency distortions under two types of destination-based corporate
cash-flow taxes. Auerbach and Devereux (2015) have shown that a sales-apportioned cash-flow
tax will distort consumer prices; this paper shows that those distortions are generally quite
small, and are limited solely to industries in which economic profits are earned, and consump-
tion is already significantly distorted. This paper also shows that a border-adjusted cash-flow
tax will distort consumption decisions that cross borders, such as travel, higher education, and
retirement location. In addition, it would affect labor migration decisions, especially for mi-
grants who plan either to migrate only temporarily, or to remit a substantial fraction of their
earning back to their home country.
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The corporate income tax distorts a broad range of economic decisions, and induces a
variety of tax avoidance strategies. Increasingly, a destination-based corporate cash-flow
taxation is being considered as a desirable alternative, one that would eliminate distortions
in both marginal investment decisions and financing decisions (OECD 2007, Auerbach
Devereux and Simpson 2010, Institute for Fiscal Studies 2011).
There are two types of destination-based taxes being widely discussed. One is sales-
based formula apportionment, recommended by the European Commission (2001) for the
E.U., and advocated by Avi-Yonah et al. (2009) for the U.S. and Eichner and Runkel (2008)
for the E.U. The other is a border-adjusted cash flow tax, advocated by Auerbach (2010)
and Auerbach and Holtz-Eakin (2016).
Auerbach and Devereux (2015) suggest that while both forms of destination-based cash
flow taxes are neutral with respect to production decisions, only the border-adjusted cash
flow tax is also neutral with respect to consumption decisions. Although they are correct
that a sales-proportioned tax will distort some consumer prices, I show that the effect is
quite small.
In addition, a broadened form of their model, that allows for both consumers and work-
ers to move across borders, shows that their destination-based cash flow tax also creates
consumption distortions which a sales-apportioned cash flow tax does not generate. Hence,
from an efficiency perspective, it is not clear that the border-adjusted tax is superior,
and indeed it is possible that the sales-apportioned version of a cash-flow tax may be the
preferred alternative.
Section 1 presents a version of the Auerbach-Devereaux model, stripped down to its
bare essentials. I replicate their results for the border-adjusted tax, but find no sales-
apportioned consumption distortion. Section 2 shows why that occurred, and identifies
the market conditions necessary for a sales-apportioned tax distortion. This section also
demonstrates that those distortions will typically be very small in magnitude.
Section 3 then expands the model to allow for cross-border consumption, in forms such
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as foreign travel, foreign education, retirement to a foreign country, and remittances to
support family abroad, and labor mobility. It shows that a border-adjusted tax distorts
both consumption decisions that cross borders, and labor migration decisions.
1 The ABD Model
The model in this section is a bare-bones version of the model developed by Bond and
Devereux (2002) and Auerbach and Devereux (2015) (hereafter ABD). There are two coun-
tries, A and B, and two products, Xc and Xm. Xc is a commodity good, produced in both
countries under perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Xm is produced by
competitive multinational companies that take all prices as given. They also produce using
a constant returns to scale technology, and earn no economic profits.1 Trade between the
two countries is frictionless; there are no transportation costs.
All production uses some resource Z, in fixed supply in both countries, the price of
which is q. Z could be thought of as labor, or capital, or some optimal mix of labor and
capital. Production merely transforms this resource into the final good, so for each firm,
xij = zj . Since neither tax distorts any production decision, any more complex production
function would only add complexity without providing any additional insight.
Country A imposes a cash-flow tax at rate τ . Since there are no economic profits in
this model, and trade is assumed to balance, the tax generates no revenues whatsoever. In
both countries, consumer utility is U(xc, xm).
1.1 The Border-Adjusted CFT
Under a border-adjusted cash-flow tax (BACFT) in country A, firms can deduct costs
incurred in country A, but are taxed on all revenues in country A.2 Hence the profits of a
1In Auerbach and Devereux (2015), this sector had decreasing returns to scale. I will discuss the implications of this
difference in the next section.
2A border-adjusted tax is generally discussed as a replacement for the corporate income tax. However, if it were levied
only on corporations, exports and imports by non-corporate entities would not face a tax, nor get a deduction. This would
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competitive firm producing good c in both countries is
pi = pcAxcA(1− τ) + pcBxcB − qAzA(1− τ)− qB(xcA + xcB − zA). (1)
Competitive firms producing in A and selling in B would be at a distinct advantage,
earning positive economic profits. As production in A expands, the price of ZA is bid up;
as production in B slumps, the price of ZB falls; an equilibrium is finally attained when
pcA
pcB
=
qA
qB
=
1
(1− τ)
. (2)
Thus, a new zero-profit competitive equilibrium is eventually attained.
In the multinational sector, a firm producing and selling in both countries would have
the same profit function as in (1), with the subscripts changed from c to m. In the short
run, it would be highly profitable for the firm to shift its production to A and its sales
to B. In the long run, after the transition described above has taken place, and (2) has
been attained for the multinational sector, the firm’s sales would return back to the pretax
balance. The firm might also return its production levels in the two countries to the pretax
levels, but there is no obvious compelling reason for it to do so, and if we introduce any
type of adjustment costs into the model, we are permanently left with more production
by the multinational sector in country A, presumably offset by a shift in production in
the commodity sector to country B. Otherwise, there are no consumer distortions in the
model, since in both countries, pcj = pmj .
1.2 The Sales-Apportioned CFT
Under a sales-apportioned cash-flow tax (SACFT) in country A, corporations are taxed on
all revenues in country A, but can deduct only a share of their costs, regardless of where
those costs were incurred. For a firm in the commodity sector selling all its production in
put non-corporate exporters at a severe tax disadvantage, and non-corporate importers at a major advantage. Thus, it would
be necessary to subject all businesses to these tax rules.
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country A, regardless of its location, all revenues would be taxed and all costs deducted,
so the tax has no effect on the zero-profit competitive equilibrium. Any firm selling all its
production in country B, again regardless of its location, would be unaffected by the tax.
Hence there would be no economic transition, no short-run shifting of production or sales,
and no long-run change in the two countries’ price levels.
In the multinational sector, profits of a firm producing and selling in both countries
would be
pi = pmAxmA(1− τ) + pmBxmB − q(zA + zB)(1− θA), (3)
where θA is the revenue-weighted rate at which costs are deducted,
θA =
pmAxmAτ
pmAxmA + pmBxmB
. (4)
Note that a change in sales changes the firm’s θA:
dθA
dxmA
=
τpmApmBxmB
(pmAxmA + pmBxmB)2
. (5)
Therefore the first order condition for profit maximization with respect to xmA, noting that
(zA + zB) = xmA + xmB, is
dpi
dxmA
= pmA(1− τ)− q(1− θA) + q(xmA + xmB)
τpmApmBxmB
(pmAxmA+pmBxmB)2
= pmA(1− τ)− q(1− τ) + q(pmA − pmB)
τpmBx
2
mB
(pmAxmA+pmBxmB)2
= 0,
(6)
which is satisfied at pmA = pmB = q. So in this perfectly competitive, zero economic profits
model, the sales-apportioned cash-flow tax, like its border-adjusted counterpart, creates no
consumer distortions, but does so without any messy transition.
This is not the result that Auerbach and Devereux derived. To understand the difference,
I will explore the potential distortions of a SACFT in more detail in the next section.
5
2 The Economic Distortions of a SACFT
Auerbach and Devereux found “an effective tax or subsidy on consumption” due to the
SACFT; in the previous section, I found no such distortion. To understand why, consider
the general case of a profit maximizing monopolist. Under a SACFT levied at rates τA and
τB in the two countries, its after-tax profits will be
pi = RA(1− τA) +RB(1− τB)− CT (1− θ), (7)
where Ri is total revenues from sales in country i and CT is the total cost of producing
qA + qB, and now
θ =
RAτA +RBτB
RA +RB
. (8)
The change in θ with respect to revenue is now
dθ
dRi
=
(τi − τj)Rj
(RA +RB)2
, (9)
so the firm’s first order condition for profit maximization becomes
dpi
dRi
= R′i(1− τi)− C
′
T (1− θ) + CT
R′i(τi − τj)Rj
(RA +RB)2
= 0 (10)
which after considerable manipulation reduces to
R′i = C
′
T
[
(RA + RB)(1− θ)
(RA +RB)(1− θ)− pi(τi − θ)
]
(11)
Economic efficiency requires the term in brackets to equal one. That condition will be
satisfied if either (a) both countries levy the same tax rate, so τA = θ = τB, or (b) that
the firm earns zero economic profits. Hence when Auerbach and Devereux defined their
multinational sector to have decreasing returns to scale and therefore economic profits,
they found an economic distortion due to the SACFT; when I adopted a constant returns
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to scale, zero economic profit model, I did not.3
Thus, while a SACFT will distort consumer markets that generate economic profits, it
will have no effect on either purely competitive or monopolistic competitive markets, which
represent a significant share of trade. Further it will leave the choice between a corporate
or non-corporate form unaffected in these industries. However, a major fraction of trade
is carried out by multinationals with some degree of market power, and (11) shows that
those markets will be distorted by the SACFT.
To get a sense of the magnitude of that distortion, our monopolist faces the linear
demand curves PA = 300− .5QA and PB = 300−QB, and produces at constant marginal
cost C ′T = 100, portrayed in Figure 1. The profit maximizing choices in the absence of
taxation are P = 200, QA = 200, and QB = 100, indicated by the dotted lines in the figure.
The total deadweight loss due to the firm’s market power, shaded gray in the figure, is
15,000, and the firm’s economic profit is 30,000.
Figure 1: Profit Maximizing Monopolist under SACFT
P
300
200
100
200 400 QA
D
P
300
200
100
100 200 QB
D
Suppose now that countries A and B impose SACFTs at τA = 40% and τB = 20%. The
profit maximizing conditions (11) for QA and QB are solved at approximately PA = 202.7,
QA = 194.6, PB = 195.5, and QB = 104.5, indicated by the solid lines in the figure. The
3In their appendix equation (A.2), if pi is set equal to zero, the equation reduces to p∗
1
h′(x∗
1
)f1(k∗,m∗) = 1, which is the
profit maximizing condition in the absence of taxation.
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additional deadweight loss due to the tax differential is 17.33, on a combined tax revenue
of 9941.4 (7896.6 in country A, 2044.8 in country B). Thus, while nonzero, the distortion
associated with a SACFT would be limited solely to markets dominated by firms with
substantial economic profits, and would be trivially small.
Figure 1 depicted a firm whose economic profits derived from the demand for its unique
product. Auerbach and Devereux, in contrast, modeled multinational firms selling at a
market-determined price, but generating profits due to an increasing marginal cost function.
Imagine an industry with many firms, all of who have the cost function Ci = Q
2
i /3. If the
market demand curves were the same as in Figure 1, the untaxed profit maximum would
again be at P = 200, QA = 200, and QB = 100. The imposition of SACFTs at τA = 40%
and τB = 20% would have led to a new equilibrium at roughly PA = 209.7, QA = 180.8,
PB = 181.3 and QB = 118.7, indicated by the solid circles on the figure’s demand curves.
However, that result is an upper bound on the distortion, since it assumes that all
the firms are homogeneous, with identical increasing cost curves. The industry that the
Auerbach-Devereux model best describes is the oil industry, where costs vary considerably
between producers. Firms sell their product at a market determined price, but generate
significant economic profits when they own relatively low-cost sources of oil. Since the
distortion is proportionate to profits, we would expect high profit multinationals to shift
their sales from A to B. However, lower profit firms would be willing to accept a smaller
price differential, and if there are many marginal producers earning close to normal returns,
any price differential would draw them entirely to the high-tax market. Indeed, in the
absence of transportation costs, we could well have a separating equilibrium, with little to
no price differential, but also little to no tax revenue in the higher tax rate country.
Overall, these results suggest that a SACFT would indeed result in a small but nonzero
additional distortion of some consumer markets. If a BACFT, as ABD suggest, results in
no economic distortions whatsoever, it would indeed appear to be the preferred option.
The next section explores whether that is in fact the case.
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3 Mobile Individuals
The model in Section 1 implicitly assumed that consumers are immobile. Goods are im-
ported and exported, but the residents of A who earn their income in A stay put, consuming
only goods produced in or imported into A. This is a normal, simplifying assumption that
is also implicit to the ABD models, and usually an innocuous one. That it is not innocuous
here should be apparent once it is relaxed.
Suppose there is a third good, Xf , that can be consumed either at home or abroad. Ex-
amples would include domestic/foreign travel, domestic/foreign higher education, domes-
tic/foreign retirement consumption, and consumption financed through foreign remittances.
I will assume that the industry is perfectly competitive, which is probably a reasonable ap-
proximation.
3.1 BACFT
Section 1 confirmed the basic ABD conclusion: that under a BACFT, the price levels in
the two countries will adjust until
piA
piB
= φ, (12)
where φ = 1/(1−τ). Thus, after the transition following the imposition of the BACFT has
completed, the prices of Xm, Xc, and Xf in country A will all be φ times their counterparts
in country B.
Consider now a consumer in country B, with utility function U(xm, xc, xfA, xfB). That
consumer now faces prices {pmB, pcB, φpfA, pfB}. The BACFT has distorted his or her
consumption choices away from xfA, even though, in this all-competitive model, the tax
generates zero tax revenue. Similarly, the utility maximizing choices of consumers in county
A have been distorted, with pfB now only 1/φ as large as its pretax level, relative to the
other prices this consumer faces. Hence, we would expect a BACFT to generate signifi-
cant substitution effects between foreign and domestic travel, foreign and domestic higher
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education, and foreign and domestic retirement location decisions for the residents of both
countries.
3.2 SACFT
Under a SACFT in country A, any corporations producing Xf would be taxed on their
revenues in country A, but can deduct only the share of their costs associated with those
revenues. Since the firms in this sector are almost always country-specific, and generate
only normal returns, there would be almost no additional economic distortion due to the
tax. An exception would be any mega-entertainment corporations like Disney, that generate
economic profits in multiple locations worldwide. However, the previous sections suggest
that any distortion generated by the SACFT in the behavior of these firms would be dwarfed
by the impacts of the BACFT on these firms’ sales.
3.3 Mobile Labor
Consumers are not the only ones who demonstrate at least some degree of mobility. Labor
is also somewhat mobile, in many cases despite the best efforts of some countries to limit
that mobility.
Consider an individual born in country B. Suppose first that he or she migrates to
A permanently, and only earns and consumes in A thereafter. Under a SACFT, his or
her wage rate and consumer prices will be mostly unchanged, so the migration choice is
almost entirely unaffected by the tax. Under a BACFT, his or her nominal wage rate and
consumer prices will all be φ times higher in A, but his or her real consumption will be
unaffected by the tax.
Suppose however that the migration decision is only partial, or temporary: that the
migrant plans either to return eventually to his or her home country B, or plans to support
family members back home through financial remittances. Let α represent the share of
income earned in A that would be consumed in A if migration occurs, with the remaining
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(1 − α) being taken or sent home to B. Again, under a SACFT, his or her wage rate
and consumer prices will be mostly unchanged, so the migration choice is almost entirely
unaffected by the tax. However now, under a BACFT, all of his or her nominal wages
earned in A will be φ times higher, but only that fraction α of the consumption those wages
purchase will be φ times higher. Thus, a BACFT would distort the migration decisions of
workers located in B, increasing their incentive to cross the border. The opposite effect
would happen with potential temporary migrants from A to B.
4 Conclusion
Auerbach and Devereux found that a SACFT would have a distortionary effect on consumer
prices, but a BACFT would be neutral in both production and consumption decisions. My
results show that those conclusions are incomplete. A SACFT does indeed distort consumer
prices, but those distortions are generally quite small, and are limited solely to industries
in which economic profits are earned, and consumption is already significantly distorted.
Perfectly competitive or monopolistic competitive industries would be entirely unaffected
by the tax.
My results also show that a BACFT is not without its own consumption distortions.
Consumption decisions that cross borders, such as travel, higher education, and retirement
location, would all be significantly distorted by the tax. In addition, labor migration deci-
sions would be affected, especially for migrants who plan either to migrate only temporarily
or to remit a substantial fraction of their earning back to their home country. Thus, the
adoption of a BACFT would be expected to result in significant changes in all of these
behaviors.
My results do not make clear which tax would be less distortionary overall. That calculus
would involve weighing many small distortions from the one tax against fewer quite large
distortions from the other; it is not obvious that sufficiently finely-detailed data for that
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comparison exists. However, my results do make clear that the overly simple comparison
provided by ABD is misleading. There maybe be an efficiency case to be made for the
border-adjusted tax over its sales-apportioned counterpart, but it is not the slam dunk
that the ABD results suggest.
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